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ABSTRACT: The Article critically engages with the case law of the Court of Justice on the application 
of Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment to cross-border transfers of companies. In par-
ticular, it demonstrates that the Court has come to consider the possibility for companies to use 
freedom of establishment as a tool to choose the law applicable to them as an objective of the rel-
evant Treaty provisions, rather than as an abuse. The recently adopted Polbud judgment (Court of 
Justice, judgment of 25 October 2017, case C-106/16, Polbud [GC]) represents a fitting example in 
this regard. Here the Court held that Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment apply even in 
cases where the converting company has no intention to pursue any economic activity in the host 
State. Moreover, it posited that trying to relocate in another Member State with the sole purpose 
of paying lower taxes does not constitute an abuse and, thus, does not justify the adoption of re-
strictive measures by the departure Member State. The Article critically engages with this line of 
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cases, showing its impact on recent attempts to harmonize the rules on cross-border transfers of 
companies. In particular, the analysis focuses on the 2018 Commission Proposal for a Directive 
regarding cross-border conversions, demonstrating that it tends to prioritize the promotion of 
freedom of establishment over competing interest and values, such as the respect for the integrity 
of national tax systems or the protection of workers’ rights.  
 
KEYWORDS: freedom of establishment – regulatory competition – abuse of law – cross-border trans-
fers – taxation – workers’ rights. 
 
I. Free movement of companies and regulatory competition in the 
EU: Some introductory remarks 
Art. 54 TFEU indicates that freedom of establishment also applies to companies and 
firms “formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered 
office, central administration or principal place of business within the Union”. Conse-
quently, companies have the right to freely move from one Member State to another, 
by transferring their central administration or head office, or, alternatively, by setting up 
a branch, an agency or a subsidiary. 
The ability of companies to move freely across borders represents the main driver 
of regulatory competition. The relationship between regulatory competition and the Eu-
ropean integration process is a controversial one. First, the multi-tiered structure of EU 
legal order creates the perfect conditions for regulatory competition. Economic actors 
can exploit the differences existing between national legal orders thanks to the creation 
of an integrated market space at supranational level. Adhering to the neoliberal vision 
of this process, some perceive regulatory competition as a force that contributes to the 
dismantling of the regulatory barriers to the free circulation of goods and services. 
From their point of view, regulatory competition is not an accident, and even less an 
abuse, but a constituent element of the internal market.  
Conversely, there is now greater awareness of the fact that regulatory competition 
can be a threat for the legitimacy and the acceptability of the European integration pro-
cess as a whole. Fostering unbridled intra-EU regulatory competition comes at the ex-
penses of the pursuit of non-economic objectives and the safeguard of non-economic 
values, which tend to be perceived just as obstacles on the road toward greater effi-
ciency. Furthermore, the process encroaches upon Member States’ autonomy in the 
exercise of their legislative prerogatives in fields, such as taxation or social policy, that 
are still their exclusive competence. This occurs with regard to both the content of the 
norms, which must conform to the expectations of market actors even at the expenses 
of the pursuit of other competing objectives, and the legislative process. As for the lat-
ter, the unleashing of regulatory competition contributes to transforming law-making 
from a political process to a market-based one. 
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Against this background, the Article purports to shed more light on the status of 
regulatory competition in the EU legal order and, thus, on how far national authorities 
can go in confronting it: whether they have to accept this process as a corollary – or 
even an objective – of the internal market or whether they can consider it as an abuse 
and, thus, take action against it. To this end, the Article focuses at the rules governing 
the free movement of companies in the EU, focusing, in particular, on the scope of ap-
plication of the freedom of establishment and the limits thereto. The first part critically 
engages with the Court’s case-law concerning the applicability of Treaty rules on free-
dom of establishment when companies wish to transfer in another Member State just 
to change law applicable to their formation or activity and not to carry out any genuine 
economic activity there. The second part of the analysis deals with the restrictive ap-
proach adopted by the Court when it comes to the application of the doctrine of abuse 
to law shopping cases. In this context, the Article criticizes the Court’s approach accord-
ing to which promoting law shopping constitutes an objective of the EU provisions on 
freedom of establishment, prevailing on other competing objectives. The latest part of 
the Article shows the impact of the Court’s case-law on recent attempts to harmonize 
the rules on cross-border transfers of companies. In particular, the analysis focuses on 
the 2018 Commission Proposal for a Directive regarding cross-border conversions, 
demonstrating that it tends to prioritize the promotion of freedom of establishment 
over competing interest and values, such as the respect for the integrity of national tax 
systems or the protection of workers’ rights.  
II. Lack of genuine economic activity in the host State and the 
application of Treaty rules on freedom of establishment to the 
transfers of companies 
ii.1. An economic activity-based definition of establishment: AG Kokott 
in Polbud 
The question whether EU provisions on freedom of establishment also cover transfers 
of companies aiming uniquely at changing the legal clothes with no intention to pursue 
an actual business in the host State finds no answer in EU primary and secondary law. 
On the one hand, Arts 49 and 54 do not define the notion of establishment, while, on 
the other, legislative efforts directed at regulating cross-border transfers of companies 
have largely failed to tackle this issue.1 
The gap has been filled by the Court, which has progressively broadened the scope 
of application of freedom of establishment. Polbud, a judgment adopted by the Court in 
 
1 See specifically E. SØRENSEN, M. NEVILLE, Corporate Migration in the European Union, in Columbia 
Journal of European Law, 2000, p. 181 et seq. 
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October 2017, represents a fitting example in this regard.2 The case concerned the de-
cision of a Polish company to convert into a private limited liability company governed 
by Luxembourg law, while continuing to carry out its activity in Poland. The Polish legis-
lation stood in the way of this plan, making the cancellation from the national commer-
cial register conditional upon the company being wound up after being liquidated. Pol-
bud, wishing to retain its personality, refused to fulfil this requirement and, accordingly, 
saw its application to be removed by the Polish register rejected by the competent au-
thorities. Consequently, it brought a judicial action against this decision, claiming that 
the requirement imposed by the Polish legislation was incompatible with Arts 49 and 54 
TFEU. The Polish Government, backed by other intervening Member States, contested 
the applicability of these provisions in the case at hand, pointing to the fact that Polbud 
was just trying to change its legal clothes for tax purposes, without any intention to pur-
sue a genuine economic activity in Luxembourg.  
AG Kokott concurred with these States. In her Opinion in the case, she held that, as-
suming that the claim put forward by the Polish Government was correct, the situation 
did not fall under the scope of application of EU rules on freedom of establishment. In-
deed, “although that freedom gives economic operators in the European Union the 
right to choose the location of their economic activity, it does not give them the right to 
choose the law applicable to them”.3 Her reasoning starts from the seemingly unassail-
able premise that freedom of establishment’s rules should apply only to operations in-
volving an act of establishment.4 According to AG Kokott, the notion inevitably presup-
poses the exercise by the undertaking of a genuine economic activity in the host Mem-
ber State on a stable and continuous basis. This view on establishment corresponds to 
the one codified by Art. 4 of the Services Directive,5 which defines establishment as “the 
actual pursuit of an economic activity, as referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty, by the 
provider for an indefinite period and through a stable infrastructure from where the 
business of providing services is actually carried out”. Moreover, the definition is per-
fectly in line with the one prevailing in the Court’s case-law. In Gebhard, a seminal 
judgment in this matter, it held that “[t]he concept of establishment within the meaning 
of the Treaty is therefore a very broad one, allowing a Community national to partici-
pate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other 
than his State of origin and to profit therefrom”.6 Likewise, in Stauffer, the Court ex-
cluded the applicability of Art. 49 TFEU to the case of an Italian charitable foundation 
holding commercial premises in Germany that were rented out by a German property 
 
2 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 October 2017, case C-106/16, Polbud [GC]. 
3 Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 4 may 2017, case C-106/16, Polbud, para. 38. 
4 Ibid., para. 35. 
5 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on ser-
vices in the internal market. 
6 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 November 1995, case C-55/94, Gebhard, para. 25. 
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agent. Indeed, despite satisfying the requirement of a permanent presence in the host 
State, the foundation did not carry out any genuine economic activity there, since it did 
not actively managed the property.7 Furthermore, AG Kokott highlighted that the Court 
has referred to an economic activity-based definition of establishment also in a number 
of judgments specifically concerning the free movement of companies. Both in Cadbury 
Schweppes and in VALE, for instance, it maintained that the notion of establishment 
“presupposes the actual establishment of the company concerned and the pursuit of 
genuine economic activity there”.8 
AG Kokott did not elaborate much on what it takes to demonstrate that the compa-
ny is pursuing a genuine economic activity. She made just some passing references, 
both in the body of the Opinion and in footnotes, to certain elements – such as the ex-
istence of “a level of infrastructure” enabling the pursuit of business – that can have a 
bearing. Overall, following the idea that the notion of establishment is to be interpreted 
broadly, AG Kokott seemed to set quite a low bar when it came to demonstrating that 
the company fulfils the requirement at hand. Not only may the “renting of premises for 
business purposes” be enough, but “even the intention to effect such establishment is 
sufficient”. Absent any of these elements, cross-border conversions having the sole ob-
jective of changing the lex societatis are excluded from the scope of application of Trea-
ty rules on freedom of establishment. This conclusion has the merit to fully embed cor-
porate mobility into the internal market,9 to be intended as an area where all the obsta-
cles to the free movement have been removed in order to stimulate the pursuit of ac-
tual business activities across border and not to increase regulatory competition oppor-
tunities. AG Kokott’s approach openly rejects the idea that regulatory competition can 
be considered as an objective of the internal market and even “an integral part of the 
constitutional structure of the European Union”.10  
ii.2. Applying freedom of establishment rules when there is no genuine 
economic activity: the approach of the Court 
For all its merits, the Court decided not to adhere to the solution proposed by AG Ko-
kott, rejecting the proposition according to which freedom of movement rules apply on-
ly when the company pursues a genuine economic activity in the host State. Indeed, ac-
cording to the Court it is immaterial whether the company wishes to convert into an en-
 
7 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 September 2006, case C-386/04, Stauffer, paras 19-20. 
8 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2012, case C-378/10, VALE, para. 34; judgment of 12 Septem-
ber 2006, case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes [GC], para. 54. 
9 J. MEEUSEN, Freedom of Establishment, Conflict of Laws and the Transfer of a Company’s Registered 
Office: Towards Full Cross-Border Corporate Mobility in the Internal Market?, in Journal of Private Interna-
tional Law, 2017, p. 322.  
10 W. KERBER, Interjurisdictional Competition within the European Union, in Fordham International 
Law Journal, 1999-2000, p. 234. 
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tity governed by the law of another Member State without any intention to conduct its 
business there. This type of transformation falls in any case within the scope of applica-
tion of Arts 49 and 54 TFEU, being it an economic operation in respect of which Member 
States have to comply with the freedom of establishment.11 The only requirements to 
be fulfilled are, first, that the converting company has been formed in accordance with 
the legislation of a Member State and has its registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the EU and, second, that the conditions set forth by 
the legislation of the State of destination are satisfied.12 Any consideration concerning 
the activity that the converting company is set to carry out in the host Member State is 
immaterial in this context.  
The formalistic approach adopted by the Court led to a solution that seems to be 
logically flawed, coming to admit the applicability of freedom of establishment rules to 
situations where there is no establishment. Yet, the choice to disconnect the scope of 
application of freedom of establishment from the exercise of any genuine economic ac-
tivity in the host State, allowing corporations to rely on these provisions to change their 
legal clothes, is in line with the Court’s case-law on corporate cross-border transfers.  
This approach had been first adopted in Segers,13 a case concerning the exclusion 
from a national sickness scheme of the director of a company incorporated in England 
that did business entirely in the Netherlands. Replying to the doubts expressed by the 
national court as for the relevance of the latter element, the Court made clear that Art. 
58 EEC (now Art. 54 TFEU) “requires only that the companies be formed in accordance 
with the law of a Member State and have their registered office, central administration 
or principal place of business within the Community. Provided that those requirements 
are satisfied, the fact that the company conducts its business through an agency, 
branch or subsidiary solely in another Member State is immaterial”.14 The ruling repre-
sented the first moment in which the Court came to admit, even though only implicitly, 
that the freedom of establishment could be a vehicle for law shopping. In his Opinion in 
the case, AG Darmon made it more explicit, arguing that “the logical consequence of the 
rights guaranteed under the Treaty [is] the fact that a national of a Member State may 
take advantage of the flexibility of United Kingdom company law”.15  
At first, despite its potentially far-reaching implications for company law, Segers re-
ceived relatively little consideration in the literature. One of the main reasons is that 
two years later the Court adopted Daily Mail, a judgment that “came as a godsend for 
those cherishing the role of the real seat theory as a protective mechanism against reg-
 
11 Polbud [GC], cit., paras 31-33. 
12 Ibid., para. 33. 
13 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 July 1986, case 79/85, Segers. 
14 Ibid., para. 16. 
15 Opinion of AG Darmon delivered on 10 June 1986, case 79/85, Segers, para. 6. 
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ulatory arbitrage”.16 The case concerned the attempt by a UK company to transfer its 
central management in the Netherlands, while retaining its British legal personality in 
order to save taxes. British authorities refused to give their consent to the transfer until 
an exit tax had been fully paid. Daily Mail challenged the refusal in front of a national 
court, claiming that it constituted a violation of the right to move the central manage-
ment and control in another member States, as provided for by Treaty rules on the 
freedom of establishment. The Court rejected the claim, making clear that such rules, 
“properly construed, confer no right on a company incorporated under the legislation of 
a Member State and having its registered office there to transfer its central manage-
ment and control to another Member State”.17  
However, around the year 2000 the Court adopted a series of judgments that 
“shook the foundations of European corporate law”18 and, as far as the notion of estab-
lishment is concerned, reverted to the approach that was already latent in Segers. The 
first, and possibly the best-known, episode of the series is Centros, a case concerning 
the exercise of the freedom of establishment by a British company that had been set up 
by a Danish couple with the sole purpose of circumventing the Danish legislation on the 
paying up of the minimum share capital.19 This was the reason why the competent Dan-
ish authorities had refused to register Centros’ branch office. The Court rejected the 
claim put forward by the Danish Government according to which the situation had a 
purely internal character, falling outside freedom of establishment’s scope of applica-
tion. Pointedly, the Court posited that it is “immaterial” whether the company has been 
established in a country where it does not conduct any business and with sole purpose 
of benefiting from a laxer corporate law.20 The only relevant element is that Centros has 
been formed in accordance with the UK legislation and has its registered office there.21  
The Court stuck to the same interpretative approach in other subsequent judgments 
concerning the free movement of companies. The Überseering case concerned the acqui-
sition by two Germans of all the shares of a Dutch company, which was then led to con-
 
16 M. GELTER, Centros, the Freedom of Establishment for Companies and the Court’s Accidental Vision 
for Corporate Law, in F. NICOLA, B. DAVIES (eds), EU Law Stories. Contextual and Critical Histories of Euro-
pean Jurisprudence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 321. 
17 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 September 1988, case 81/87, Daily Mail, para. 25. 
18 M. GELTER, Centros, cit., p. 309. 
19 Court of Justice, judgment of 9 March 1999, case C-212/97, Centros, para. 18. The judgment at-
tracted much attention by both legal scholars and Governments. As for the former, see, ex multis, K.E. 
SØRENSEN, Prospects for European Company Law After the Judgment of the European Court of Justice in 
Centros Ltd, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 1999, p. 203 et seq.; S. DEAKIN, Two Types 
of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonization. A Law and Econom-
ics Perspective on Centros, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 1999, p. 231 et seq.; F. 
MUNARI, P. TERRILE, The Centros Case and the Rise of an EC Market for Corporate Law, in Il Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea, 2001, p. 1 et seq. 
20 Centros, cit., para. 17. 
21 Ibid., paras 20-21. 
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duct all its business in Germany. German courts, adopting a strict interpretation of the re-
al seat theory, denied the recognition of Überseering as a legal entity. The company chal-
lenged this reading, contending that it was incompatible with EU rules on freedom of es-
tablishment. In the preliminary proceeding before the Court, one of the intervening 
Member States contested the applicability of these rules to the case at hand, due to the 
lack of a real and continuous link with the economy of the home State.22 The Court reject-
ed the claim, contending that such requirement applies only when the company “has 
nothing but its registered office within the Community”.23 The very same approach was 
adopted in Inspire Art, a judgment concerning the compatibility with the rules on freedom 
of establishment of a Dutch legal act establishing that the directors of formally foreign 
companies were jointly and severally liable if the company had not the minimum capital 
imposed by the Dutch legislation. Some Governments asserted that, in the case of com-
panies not carrying out any substantial activity in the State where they are formally estab-
lished, the setting up of a branch in another Member State ought to be regarded as a 
form of primary establishment, rather than a secondary one. The reasoning rested on the 
assumption that the purpose of the rules on freedom of establishment “is to enable un-
dertakings carrying on activities in one Member States to achieve growth in another 
Member State, which is not so in the case of ‘brass-plate companies’”.24 Once again, the 
Court resolutely dismissed this argument, reiterating that the fact that a company is 
formed in one Member State and then carries out its main, or even entire, business in an-
other Member State is “irrelevant with regard to application of the rules on freedom of 
establishment”.25 The Court made clear that this holds true even in those cases where the 
decision to establish in one Member State has the sole purpose of benefiting of more fa-
vourable legislation.26 Therefore, the Court openly admitted that freedom of establish-
ment can be legitimately used as a vehicle for regulatory competition, barring the sole 
cases where this is done fraudulently or abusively.  
This case-law is not contradicted by those judgments concerning cross-border cor-
porate mobility cited by AG Kokott to back her choice to link the notion of establish-
ment to the exercise of a genuine economic activity in the host State. Admittedly, both 
in Cadbury Schweppes and VALE, the Court adopted an activity-based notion of estab-
lishment only when reviewing the justification of a restriction and not when defining the 
scope of application of the rules on freedom of establishment. This notwithstanding, 
writing before Polbud, some authors argued that this bore little relevance, since 
“[n]othing in the wording of both judgments suggest that the Court wishes to limit the 
 
22 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 November 2002, case C-208/00, Überseering, para. 74. 
23 Ibid., para. 75. 
24 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 September 2003, case C-167/01, Inspire Art, paras 84-85. 
25 Ibid., para. 95. 
26 Ibid., para. 98. 
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impact of its interpretation”.27 In their view, these judgments had to be understood as 
reviving the criterion of the “actual pursuit of an economic activity”, as elaborated in 
Daily Mail,28 and, consequently, excluding from the scope of application of Treaty rules 
on freedom of establishment artificial incorporations aiming uniquely at benefiting 
from a more favourable legislation. This understanding is now untenable in the light of 
Polbud. Indeed, as seen above, the judgment made clear that freedom of establishment 
also protects cross-border conversions having the sole scope of modifying the law ap-
plicable to the corporation, although the transforming company has not even the inten-
tion to pursue an economic activity in the host Member State.29 
Unlike in other cases, here the concept of establishment is not interpreted “so as to 
limit the risk of abuse”.30 This does not mean that EU law on freedom of establishment 
condones any corporate cross-border transformation having just an artificial character, 
but it certainly constrains Member States’ capacity of reaction by making law shopping 
the rule and any measure seeking to limit it just an exception.  
III. Law shopping as an abuse of the rules on freedom of 
establishment? 
iii.1. The restrictive reading of the doctrine of abuse in cases 
concerning cross-border transfer of companies 
Member States intervening before the Court in the cases on free movement of compa-
nies constantly claimed that corporate transformations not involving the pursuit of an 
economic activity in the host State and aiming at circumventing the applicable national 
legislation amounted to an abuse. The claim has been advanced either (or both) to 
plead for the exclusion of these operations from the scope of application of the free-
dom of establishment or (and) to justify the adoption of restrictive measures thereon.  
 
27 J. MEEUSEN, Freedom of Establishment, cit., 318. 
28 See, more specifically, Opinion of AG Darmon delivered on 7 June 1988, case 81/87, Daily Mail, para. 3. 
29 See M. SZYDŁO, Cross-Border Conversion of Companies under Freedom of Establishment: Polbud 
and Beyond, in Common Market Law Review, 2018, p. 1557 et seq. The Author strongly supports the ap-
proach adopted by the Court, which, in his view, “does not mean abandoning the principle that freedom 
of establishment requires the actual pursuit of a genuine economic activity through a fixed establishment 
in the host Member State for an indefinite period”. However, the attempt to reconcile Polbud with the 
case law that adopted an activity-based notion of establishment is unconvincing. Indeed, according to the 
Author, in Polbud the company was seeking to pursue an economic activity in the host State, which, after 
the conversion, has become its previous home Member State, i.e. Poland. However, this reasoning com-
pletely misses the fact that in this case the exercise of the freedom of establishment was not functional to 
the pursuit of the economic activity, which continued unaffected by the conversion.  
30 K.E. SØRENSEN, Abuse of Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or Merely Rhetoric?, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2006, p. 428. 
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The notion of abuse is a frequent presence in the Court case law.31 This notwith-
standing, the recourse to this concept in the EU legal order is still controversial from a 
terminological, conceptual and operative perspective.32 The fact that, as seen above, 
the notion of abuse is considered both as a reason to the exclude the applicability of 
the relevant Treaty rules and as a valid ground to derogate from these rules speaks vol-
umes in this regard. However, an in-depth examination of the reasons that explain this 
state of confusion lies well beyond the scope of this Article.  
The prohibition to rely upon EU law for abusive or fraudulent ends is considered as a 
general principle of EU law.33 Contrary to several Advocates General,34 for quite some time 
the Court refused to admit it openly. It was only in Kofoed, a judgment of 2007 concerning 
the charging of income tax in respect of an exchange of shares, that the Court explicitly 
held that the prohibition of abuse of rights is “a general Community law principle”.35  
Despite its initial reticence, the Court has played a major role in the consolidation of 
this principle, delineating, inter alia, the operational criteria for assessing the existence 
of an abuse. The landmark judgment in this regard is Emsland-Stärke, a case concerning 
a German company exporting potato-based products to Switzerland just to obtain an 
export refund, before immediately shipping them back to Germany to be put on the 
market. There the Court came to define the notion of abuse on the basis of two main 
elements.36 The first one is the so-called objective test, according to which the “finding 
of an abuse requires […] a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite 
formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of 
those rules has not been achieved”.37 This element measures the distance between the 
formal respect of the rules and the substantive achievements of their aims, which lays 
at the core of the notion of abuse. The second element, the so-called subjective test, 
looks at “the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating 
 
31 A. SAYDÉ, Abuse of EU Law and Regulation of the Internal Market, Oxford and Portland: Hart Pub-
lishing, 2016, p. 11 et seq. The Author observed that references to this notion, or related ones, can be 
found in one out of ten judgments and in one out of five opinions delivered by Advocate Generals. 
32 A. SAYDÉ, Abuse of EU Law, cit., p. 9; M. GESTRI, Abuso del diritto e frode alla legge nell’ordinamento 
comunitario, Milano: Giuffrè, 2003, p. 13 et seq. 
33 R. DE LA FERIA, S. VOGENAUER (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law?, 
Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2011; D. TRIANTAFYLLOU, L’interdiction des abus de droit en tant que 
principe général du droit communautaire, in Cahiers de Droit Européen, 2002, p. 612 et seq.  
34 See, for instance, Opinion of AG La Pergola delivered on 16 July 1998, case C-212/97, Centros, pa-
ra. 20. Admittedly, AG La Pergola also pointed out that “[i]t is however by no means easy to define the 
precise scope of that principle”. 
35 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 July 2007, case C-321/05, Kofoed, para. 38. 
36 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 December 2000, case C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke. On the test see 
specifically P. KOUTRAKOS, The Emsland-Stärke Abuse of Law Test in the Law of Agriculture and Free 
Movement of Goods, in R. DE LA FERIA, S. VOGENAUER (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. 203 et seq. 
37 Emsland-Stärke, cit., para. 52. 
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artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it”.38 Recourse to this second element 
has been criticized by some scholars, as well as by Advocates General. More specifically, 
AG Poiares Maduro in Halifax posited that the subjective intention of the economic op-
erators is not decisive to assess an abuse and that ‘the intentions of the parties to […] 
obtain an advantage from [EU] law are merely inferable from the artificial character of 
the situation to be assessed in the light of a set of objective circumstances”.39 The 
judgment of the Court followed the suggestion of the AG and, without abandoning the 
two-step test, held that the objective to obtain a tax advantage is proven when it is “ap-
parent from a number of objective factors”.40  
In the cases concerning the free movement of companies, the Court has generally 
adopted a very restrictive reading of the doctrine of abuse. While formally admitting the 
possibility for the Member States to invoke it in order to prevent economic operators to 
circumvent their legislation or obtain undue advantages through the application of EU 
law, de facto the Court closed off the doctrine of abuse almost entirely, even in cases 
concerning letter-box companies. Once again, it was Centros that set the tone. In that 
case, the Danish authorities claimed that forming a company in a less regulatory Mem-
ber State with the sole purpose of circumventing the Danish legislation constituted an 
abuse and that, consequently, they had the right to refuse the registration of the 
branch. The Court rejected this claim, finding against the possibility to consider the be-
haviour of Mr and Mrs Bryde as having an abusive character under EU law. It did so by 
taking into account two main aspects.  
First, it explicitly excluded that law shopping constitutes an abuse, making clear that 
“the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to 
form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the least restric-
tive and to set up branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse 
of the right of establishment”.41 Indeed, circumventing domestic rules governing the 
formation of companies fails to pass the objective test, as elaborated in Emsland-
Stärke. According to the Court, this conduct is in line with the purpose of freedom of 
establishment, i.e. allowing economic operators to pick and choose the rules of compa-
ny law that are more favourable to them and their business. The reasoning of the Court 
certifies the inclusion of the encouragement of law shopping, at least with regard to 
company law, within the objectives of the freedom of establishment.  
Second, the Court rejected the claim according to which the absence of any meaning-
ful economic activity could be considered as a proxy for the artificiality of the incorpora-
 
38 Ibid., para. 53. 
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40 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 February 2006, case C-255/02, Halifax [GC], para. 75. See more 
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tion in the UK and, thus, warrant a finding of abuse. As well explained by Saydé, the artifi-
ciality requirement serves to “identify practices that are devoid of economic rationality, 
but for the regulatory benefit claimed”.42 In this case, the fact that Centros never conduct-
ed any business in the UK and that all its activities were located in Denmark could be well 
taken as proofs of the artificial character of the situation and, thus, of its abusive nature. 
The Court decided otherwise, arguing that the absence of any meaningful economic activ-
ity in the State of incorporation “is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or 
fraudulent conduct which would entitle the latter Member State to deny that company the 
benefit of the provisions of Community law relating to the right of establishment”.43  
The Court followed the same interpretative approach in other decisions concerning 
free movement of companies and evasion of national company law. In Inspire Art, for 
instance, it reiterated that setting up a company in a Member State with the sole pur-
pose of benefiting from less restrictive company law rules is “inherent in the exercise, in 
a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty”.44 Moreo-
ver, also in this case the Court explicitly excluded that lack of genuine economic activity 
in the State of incorporation could justify the adoption of restrictive measures by the 
State in which the company wished to open a branch to carry out all of its activities.45  
iii.2. Cross-border-transfers of companies and wholly artificial 
arrangements: the rise and fall of a partial exception to the 
restrictive reading of the doctrine of abuse 
The Court seemed to have steered a new course in Cadbury Schweppes, at least with 
regard to the possibility to consider law shopping as an abuse justifying the adoption of 
restrictive measures by the competent national authorities. The case concerned the UK 
Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) legislation then in force, which taxed resident com-
panies on profits of subsidiaries established in a jurisdiction with a lower level of taxa-
tion, while exempting those with subsidiaries in the UK – even if more favourably taxed 
– or in jurisdiction with a higher level of taxation. Cadbury Schweppes Treasury Interna-
tional was a subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes that has been established in Ireland. In 
the view of the referring court, the creation of the subsidiary was aimed at avoiding the 
application of certain UK tax provisions on exchange transactions and, more in general, 
to benefit from the Irish tax regime. Therefore, it asked the Court to clarify whether 
such a conduct could be considered as an abuse of the right of establishment and, thus, 
it justified the adoption of restrictive measures by the concerned Member State.  
 
42 A. SAYDÉ, Abuse of EU Law, cit., p. 84. 
43 Centros, cit., para. 29. 
44 Inspire Art, cit., para. 138. 
45 Ibid., para. 139. 
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At first, the Court followed Centros, reiterating that the choice to form a company in 
a country with the sole purpose of benefiting from its legislation does not constitute 
abuse in itself.46 Yet, the Court admitted that there may be cases when Member States 
are entitled to restrict the enjoyment of the right of establishment. In particular, the 
British Government, backed by many other intervening Member States, maintained that 
the measure intended to counter an abusive form of tax avoidance deriving from the 
artificial transfer of a resident company to a low-tax Member State through the estab-
lishment of a subsidiary there. The Court found that a national measure restricting 
freedom of establishment can be justified if it “relates to wholly artificial arrangements 
aimed at circumventing the application of the legislation of the member State con-
cerned”.47 Quite remarkably, this finding is based on an understanding of the objective 
of the freedom of establishment that is at odds with the one elaborated in Centros. Ac-
cording to Cadbury Schweppes, the ultimate aim of this freedom is to allow a national 
of a Member State to participate on a stable basis to the economic life of another 
Member State, by carrying out an actual business therein. For good measure, the Court 
added that “the concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty provisions 
on freedom of establishment involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity 
through a fixed establishment in that State for an indefinite period”.48 Against this 
background, the creation of arrangements that do not reflect the economic reality and 
have the sole purpose of escaping the application of tax provisions is not in line with 
this objective and, consequently, have an abusive character that can justify the adoption 
by the Member States of measures restricting the right of establishment.  
This was not the first time in which the Court referred to the notion of wholly artifi-
cial arrangements.49 However, Cadbury Schweppes is the first case where the Court laid 
down the criteria to identify it. In particular, one needs to look at its physical existence 
in terms of premises, staff and equipment in the territory of the host Member State, so 
to assess whether the subsidiary carries out a genuine economic activity therein.50 Ac-
cording to this judgment, the absence of an economic activity in the host State is what 
makes the arrangement wholly artificial and, thus, abusive under EU law.51 
Cadbury Schweppes was very well received by commentators and even Advocates 
General, considering it, if compared with Centros, a more careful attempt to strike a 
balance between the competing interests at stake. Quite significantly, in his Opinion on 
Cartesio, AG Poiares Maduro affirmed that the judgment showed that “it may not al-
ways be possible to rely successfully on the right of establishment in order to establish 
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a company nominally in another Member State for the sole purpose of circumventing 
one’s own national company law” and that, consequently, it “represents a significant 
qualification of the rulings in Centros and Inspire Art”.52 Yet, it is doubtful whether, first, 
Cadbury Schweppes’ deviation from previous case-law was so significant and, second, 
whether it actually intended to deviate from previous case-law. 
As for the first aspect, it is worth considering that the Cadbury Schweppes formula 
sets quite a high threshold to prove abuse, by referring to wholly artificial arrange-
ments. This is evident if one compares this notion of abuse with the one applied by the 
Court in other contexts, such as, for instance, in VAT cases. In Halifax, for instance, it 
held that abuse is established when “the essential aim of the transactions concerned is 
to obtain a tax advantage”.53 In Part Service, another VAT case, the Court explicitly ruled 
out the possibility to interpret “essential aim of the transaction” as meaning sole pur-
pose, making clear that “there can be a finding of an abusive practice when the accrual 
of a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim of the transaction or transactions at is-
sue”.54 Therefore, unlike in the context of free movement of companies,55 in VAT cases 
an arrangement can be considered as having an abusive character “notwithstanding the 
possible existence, in addition, of economic objectives arising from, for example, mar-
keting, organisation or guarantee considerations”.56  
Second, the approach adopted by the Court in Cadbury Schweppes with regard to 
the possibility to invoke the doctrine of abuse to limit the use of freedom of establish-
ment as a vehicle for law shopping can be reconciled with Centros. Indeed, the latter 
judgment made clear that Member States cannot limit the capacity of economic opera-
tors to freely choose their own legislation only with regard to the rules governing the 
formation of companies and not also those concerning the carrying on of certain 
trades, professions or businesses. Against this background, one could infer that nation-
al authorities still had the possibility to restrict freedom of establishment when this is 
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used – or abused – in order to circumvent national tax legislation. Cadbury Schweppes 
confirmed this inference. 
However, the distinction between the two sets of rules and, consequently, the two 
associated legal regimes is not as tight as expected. There have been cases where the 
Court turned to the Centros approach to deal with situations where economic opera-
tors were invoking freedom of establishment to escape from rules governing their activ-
ity and not their formation. Viking represents a fitting and troubling example in this re-
gard. As it is well-known, the judgment concerned the decision by a Finnish company to 
reflag one of its vessels, by registering it in Estonia. The move had the sole purpose of 
modifying the law governing the wages of the crew, so to reduce them, without any 
change of physical establishment or cross-border movement. In Cadbury Schweppes 
terms, the reflagging could well be considered as a wholly artificial arrangement, having 
no other rationale than the extraction of a regulatory benefit deriving from the circum-
vention of the Finnish labour legislation. This notwithstanding, the Court did not even 
take into consideration the possibility that such transfer, entailing the use of a flag of 
convenience, could have an abusive character and, thus, justify the adoption of restric-
tive measures on this basis. As pointedly observed by Adams and Deakin, “Viking is the 
labour law equivalent to Centros”, in so far as “it validates the right of exit in the specific 
sense of a right to seek out an alternative, low-cost jurisdiction”.57 By so doing, the 
Court went a step further in asserting that the promotion of regulatory competition is 
an objective of freedom of establishment, by making clear that the creation of a market 
for the rules does not concern only company law, but also labour law.  
Polbud went in the same direction, extending the overly-restrictive notion of abuse 
elaborated in Centros in a case concerning the circumvention of national rules govern-
ing the activity of the company and not its formation. As seen above, the conversion of 
Polbud in a Luxembourg company had no other justification than the regulatory benefit 
obtained by choosing a more favourable tax legislation. This notwithstanding, the Court 
rejected the claim of the Polish Government according to which this practice was abu-
sive and, thus, it justified the restriction of Polbud’s freedom of movement. The main 
problem does not lie with the conclusion adopted by the Court, but with the argumen-
tative path taken to reach it. Indeed, it is hard to deny that the mandatory liquidation 
requirement prescribed by the Polish legislation had too wide a scope of application to 
be considered as a proportionate response to an abusive practice. As pointedly ob-
served by the Court, such measure seems to establish a “general presumption of 
abuse”,58 since it applies to any case in which a company transfers its registered office 
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from Poland to another Member State, without any consideration for the specific condi-
tions in which the transfer takes place.  
However, the Court referred to this argument just ad abundantiam, having already 
established that the decision of a company to move its registered office in another 
Member State “for the purpose of enjoying the benefit of more favourable legislation 
does not, in itself, constitute abuse”.59 Apparently, the statement seems to simply reit-
erate what said in Centros, but, in reality, it goes further than that. Indeed, Polbud did 
not refer to “company law”, but to “legislation” in general terms. This means that law 
shopping is to be considered as one of the constitutive elements of freedom of estab-
lishment – and, consequently, not an abuse – not just when it concern the rules govern-
ing the formation of the company, but any legislation affecting its activities, such as, in 
the case at hand, tax law. Quite remarkably, in Polbud the Court did not even take into 
account whether incorporating a company under Luxembourg law without it carrying 
out any economic activity there could be considered as a “wholly artificial arrangement” 
and, thus, justify the adoption of restrictive measures. 
IV. Cross-border transfer of companies and regulatory competition: 
the legislative response. Some conclusive remarks 
The analysis demonstrated that the Court has come to consider regulatory competition, 
even in its extreme forms, an objective of EU provisions on freedom of establishment, 
at least with regard to cross-border movement of companies. More specifically, the 
transfer of a company aiming uniquely at changing its legal clothes, without any inten-
tion to pursue an economic activities in the host Member State, not only falls within the 
scope of application of Arts 49 and 54 TFUE, but also enjoys an increased level of pro-
tection when it comes to the capacity of the Member States to adopt restrictive 
measures. This is particularly evident in the overly restrictive reading of the doctrine of 
abuse adopted by the Court in this context. In Centros, the Court ruled out the applica-
bility of the doctrine by finding that setting up a company in a Member State with the 
sole purpose of benefiting from a less restrictive corporate law fails to pass the so-
called objective test, being perfectly in line with the objective of freedom of establish-
ment. The judgment made clear that this interpretative approach only applied in those 
cases where law shopping concerns rules governing the formation of companies and 
not also those governing their activity. Building on this distinction and adopting a more 
activity-related reading of the notion of establishment, Cadbury Schweppes admitted 
the possibility to consider as an abuse the creation of “wholly artificial arrangements for 
circumventing the tax legislation of a Member State”. Yet, subsequent case-law set aside 
this distinction, relying on Centros in cases where the transfer aimed at extracting a 
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regulatory benefit deriving from the circumvention of rules concerning the activity of 
the company, and not its formation. This was the case of Viking and, more recently, Pol-
bud, where the Court did not even consider whether incorporating a letter-box compa-
ny in Luxembourg just to pay less taxes could be considered as a “wholly artificial ar-
rangement” and consequently, having an abusive character. 
The Court found no constraints in EU secondary law to its capacity to adopt a broad 
notion of freedom of establishment, advancing the proposition according to which such 
freedom can be used as a vehicle for unrestricted regulatory competition. At first, the 
Court considered the lack of a legislative act regulating this issue as a reason for caution 
and self-restraint. In Daily Mail, for instance, it argued that “the question whether – and 
if so how – the registered office or real head office of a company incorporated under 
national law may be transferred from one Member State to another as problems which 
are not resolved by the rules concerning the right of establishment but must be dealt 
with by future legislation or conventions”.60 Conversely, in Centros the Court completely 
changed its attitude, noting that “the fact that company law is not completely harmo-
nised in the Community is of little consequence”.61  
Since the late ‘60s, the EU has embarked in an extensive programme of corporate law 
harmonization, adopting several directives that touch upon different issues.62 The aim of 
such programme was twofold seeking, on the one hand, to create the conditions for the 
full enjoyment of the freedom of establishment by companies and, on the other, to avoid 
– or, at least, to limit – regulatory competition. In this regard, some commentators argued 
that harmonization was considered as a quid pro quo for granting the right of establish-
ment also to companies.63 The harmonization of the rules on the transfer of companies 
was one of the key components of the harmonization programme, but, this notwithstand-
ing, it has never seen the light of the day. The adoption of a directive on cross-border 
transfer of the registered office (the 14th Company Law Directive) was one of the short-
term priorities of the 2003 Commission Action Plan on Modernising Company Law.64 At 
that time, three consecutive rounds of consultations showed broad support for the adop-
tion of the directive.65 Yet, in 2007 the Commission decided not to table a proposal, citing 
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as main reasons the lack of political consensus among the Member States, the absence of 
a strong economic case and the existence of other legal tools, such as the European 
Company Statute or the Cross-Border Merger Directive, that can be used to transfer the 
seat.66 The decision to drop the proposal was not well received by the European Parlia-
ment, which kept pressing the Commission toward the adoption of a proposal on cross-
border transfer of seat, detailing a list of recommendations to be followed.67  
In 2018, the Commission bowed to the pressure, presenting a proposal for a Di-
rective amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 regarding cross-border conversions, mer-
gers and divisions.68 Building on European Parliament’s recommendations, the Pro-
posal sets both procedural and substantive rules on cross-border conversions with the 
aim of fostering companies’ cross-border mobility and, at the same time, protecting 
those affected by the conversion. The explanatory memorandum admitted that the 
Polbud judgment represented a turning point in the process toward the harmonization 
of the rules governing cross-border transformations. According to the Commission, the 
judgment confirmed the right of companies to convert cross-border, even in cases 
where there is no intention to carry out any business in the host State, but, at the same 
time, made more urgent a legislative intervention on the matter. Indeed, the “ECJ, being 
a judiciary organ, may not create any procedure for making such conversions possible 
or set out the related substantive conditions”.69 
Once adopted, the Directive would grant to limited liability companies70 the right to 
carry out a cross-border conversion without losing their legal personality. To this end, 
the converting company has to go through quite a complex screening procedure that 
sees the participation of authorities from both the departure and the destination Mem-
ber State, as well as external experts. The first step of the procedure is the preparation 
by the management of the company of the draft terms of cross-border conversion, as 
well as of two reports detailing, first, “the legal and economic aspects of the cross-
border conversion” and, second, the implications of the conversion on the safeguarding 
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of employment relationship and the conditions of employment. The draft terms and the 
reports are evaluated by an independent expert appointed by the competent authori-
ties of the departure Member State.71 The expert has to draw up a report containing a 
detailed assessment of the conversion and, to this end, he has to be entitled to obtain 
all relevant information and documents and to carry out all necessary investigations to 
verify all elements of the draft terms or management reports.72 Subsequently, the draft 
terms of conversion have to be approved by the general meeting of the company, by 
also taking into consideration the reports adopted by the management and one of the 
independent expert.73 At that point, the competent authorities of the departure Mem-
ber State can issue a pre-conversion certificate, so to attest compliance with all the rele-
vant conditions and the proper completion of all procedures and formalities. The deci-
sion to issue or, more probably, to refuse the certificate has to be amenable to judicial 
review. The last part of the procedure is far less burdensome, concerning the destina-
tion State. Here, the designated authorities have to assess the completion of its proce-
dures and formalities, confirm receipt of the pre-conversion certification and, ultimate-
ly, formally approve the conversion.74 
One of the main objectives of the screening procedure or, at least, of the part under 
the jurisdiction of the departure Member State is to avoid that cross-border conver-
sions are used as a tool for law shopping. According to Art. 86c, para. 3, of the Proposal, 
the competent authority of the departure Member State “shall not authorise the cross-
border conversion where it determines that it constitutes an artificial arrangement 
aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or contrac-
tual rights of employees, creditors or minority members”. The independent expert is 
called upon to provide the competent authorities all the relevant factual information to 
make this assessment and, “at a minimum”: the characteristics of the establishment in 
the destination Member State, including the intent, the sector, the investment, the net 
turnover and profit or loss, number of employees, the composition of the balance 
sheet, the tax residence, the assets and their location, the habitual place of work of the 
employees and of specific groups of employees, the place where social contributions 
are due and the commercial risks assumed by the converted company in the destina-
tion Member State and the departure Member State. All these elements need to be tak-
en into account by the competent authorities of the departure Member State in the in-
depth assessment carried out to determine whether the conversion constitute an artifi-
cial arrangement and, thus, in deciding whether to issue a pre-conversion certificate.75  
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The main problem is that, despite the complexity of the procedure and the apparent 
detail of the substantive conditions, these provisions looks quite timid and confused in ad-
dressing the problem of the use – or abuse – of free movement of companies as a way to 
foster regulatory competition. First, Recital 3 of the Preamble fully endorses the proposi-
tion according to which the rules on freedom of establishment apply even when the con-
version is not functional to the exercise of an economic activity in the destination Member 
State or, in other words, when the cross-border transfer aims to create a letter-box com-
pany. To this end, the Proposal explicitly upholds the over-broad reading of the notion of 
establishment adopted by the Court in Polbud and, implicitly, it advances the idea that the 
removal of barriers within the internal market is not intended just to facilitate cross-border 
economic activities, but also to encourage unhindered regulatory competition.  
At the same time, the Proposal acknowledges that freedom of establishment – and 
companies’ right to convert therein – can “be used for abusive purposes such as for the 
circumvention of labour standards, social security payments, tax obligations, creditors', 
minority shareholders' rights or rules on employees’ participation”.76 To avoid such risk, 
the Proposal imposes to the departure Member State to refuse the authorization to the 
conversion where it determines that the operation “constitutes an artificial arrange-
ment aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or 
contractual rights of employees, creditors or minority members”.77  
The provision only apparently reproduces the formula used in Cadbury Schweppes, 
introducing some elements of novelty that add to the confusion and, ultimately, could en-
able the Court to further constrain the capacity of Member States to take action against 
artificial arrangements. As seen above, the key point in Cadbury Schweppes was whether 
the arrangement made any sense from an economic point of view or whether its only ra-
tionale was to obtain a regulatory gain. In that case, the Court opted for a more restrictive 
approach than in other contexts, holding that only wholly artificial arrangements could be 
considered as having an abusive nature. The Proposal drops the reference to the fact that 
the conversion has to pursue no other objectives than obtaining regulatory benefits, 
pointing instead to other elements. Indeed, before refusing to authorize a cross-border 
conversion, departure Member States have to prove something more, i.e. that the ar-
rangement is set to generate undue benefits or that is has unduly negative effects on the 
rights of the affected workers, creditors or minority members. The Proposal does not of-
fer any clarification on how to identify the moment in which a tax advantage or an injury 
become undue. It is unclear, for instance, whether it is just a quantitative matter: Member 
States are due to tolerate up to a certain – unspecified – point and, once this threshold is 
passed, they can intervene. This state of uncertainty potentially leaves the Court with a 
wide margin of action, allowing it stretch the notion of undue as an accordion and, quite 
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likely, to reduce the capacity of departure Member States to block a cross-border conver-
sion. Indeed, one can argue that the provision can be interpreted in the sense that Mem-
ber States cannot refuse to authorize a cross-border conversion even if it is a wholly artifi-
cial arrangement, in so far as it does not generate undue tax advantages for the company 
or it unduly prejudices the rights of the workers.  
Overall, the Commission’s Proposal is very much in line with the case-law of the Court 
when it comes to the relationship between the promotion of freedom of establishment 
and the safeguard of competing interests with specific regard to cross-border movement 
of companies. Both institutions tend to prioritize the former over the latter, by making the 
possibility of choosing the most favourable legislation one of the objectives of the rules on 
freedom of establishment. Moreover, they both purport to limit the capacity of the Mem-
ber States to adopt restrictive measures, even in cases where the cross-border transfer is 
devoid of economic rationality and the competition does not just involve the rules on the 
incorporation of companies, but also those regulating their activity. In this context, the re-
spect for the integrity of national tax systems or the safeguard of the rights of the workers 
affected by the cross-border conversion are just second-tier objectives when compared 
with the right of companies to freely choose their legal clothes. 
 
